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Abstract—This paper presents design of a novel 
security architecture integrating mobile and 
broadcasting technologies in the Pay-TV system. The 
security architecture proposed herein is a state-of-the-
art solution to tackle well-known problems challenging 
current Pay-TV systems including but not limited to 
interoperability amongst service providers, relatively 
high cost of the service deployment, the security 
compromise, limited interactivity and bespoken services 
offered to subscribers. It also proposes the Follow-me 
service that enables subscribers to access their 
entitlements via an arbitrary set-top box.1  
 
Index Terms—Conditional Access (CA) System, Set-
top Box (STB), Pay-TV, Mobile, SIM-Card 
I. PREFACE 
The security consideration is an essential part of 
any business especially in Pay-TV and hence it is 
critical for the development of successful digital 
television businesses. Europe and USA were among 
the fist countries that realised the necessity of 
Conditional Access (CA) systems to prevent 
unauthorised users to gain access to the contents in 
Pay-TV services. The CA system consists of technical 
(i.e. encoding, decoding, scrambling, descrambling, 
and transmission techniques) and administrative 
services (i.e. subscription management and service 
deployment) [2]. 
There have been commercial issues concerning 
with the implementation of open standard CA system, 
control of the specification, distribution and use of 
STB containing the CA functions. Techniques like 
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common scrambling in conjunction with MPEG 
standard data transport mechanism used in Simulcrypt 
and common interface in Multicrypt, smart-card based 
solutions and downloadable conditional access 
systems have been proposed and, in some cases, 
deployed to satisfy the commercial requirements of 
broadcasters and operators [5], [6]. Nevertheless, 
none of them provides an interactive, resilient, 
scalable, updatable and cost-effective solution for CA 
system, whereby service provider and subscriber in 
broadcasting systems can truly benefit [2]. 
The conditional access and service protection 
system commonly adopts a hierarchical system for 
security key management with response to scrambling 
and encoding purposes. In DVB system, for instance, 
the content is scrambled by the Control Word (CW), 
which is included in the Entitlement Control Message 
(ECM) to be broadcast to receivers’ population. The 
ECM is encoded using the Service Key (SK), which is 
associated with the service and is valid for a period of 
time depending on the subscription type. The 
information of SK is included in the Entitlement 
Management Message (EMM). The EMM itself is 
encoded using the Master Key (MK) shared with the 
service provider and security module resided at the 
receiver side. The ECM and EMM are broadcast 
along with contents to all receivers. Each receiver 
filters its corresponding EMM messages (EMMs are 
addressed to the individual receiver) and decrypts 
ECMs using information inserted into the EMM and 
security module (i.e. smart-card). If the subscriber is 
authorised to access to the content, the CWs will be 
released to descramble the content [3]. Fig. 1 (next 
page) shows the general block diagram used in DVB 
Conditional Access system [7]. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, the 
current system is analysed and consequent 
requirements are elicited, followed by high-level 
descriptions of the Mobile Integrated Conditional 
Access System (MICAS) proposed herein. In Chapter 
3, the MICAS design and architecture is illustrated 
and analysed.  Finally, the paper is concluded in the 
Chapter 5.  
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Figure 1: DVB Condition Access System.   
II. REQUIREMENT ELICITATION  
In the current Conditional Access systems, the 
security-related data (i.e. ECM and EMM messages)  
needed for descrambling TV contents are broadcast to 
receivers’ population operating in the operator’s 
coverage area. This method of delivering sensitive 
data is neither secured nor bandwidth efficient.  
In addition, the current business model used in Pay-
TV systems follows a circle of dependency, wherein 
service provider, CA provider and STB producer have 
to work in a restricted vertical market. In this model, a 
STB producer needs to pay licence fee in order to use 
CA system in his STB and sign a non-disclosure 
agreement (NDA) with the CA system provider in 
order to enable his STB products to work under 
security considerations adopted by this CA system. 
This obvious loss of commercial scale and licence fee 
for CA subsystem make STBs quite expensive and 
since the public are reluctant to buy such kind of 
STBs, the operator has to provide them free of charge 
or substantially subsidise them. This contribution, 
however, will be eventually added to the subscription 
fee for the liable subscribers. Therefore, the high 
subscription fee would discourage public to subscribe 
to TV services and consequently encourage them to 
illegally attempt to access to contents, which would 
result in revenue loss for the service provider [9].  
Furthermore, in case of security flaws, due to lack 
of interaction between receiver and transmitter head-
ends, the service provider can not distinguish 
compromised security keys and identify the 
corresponding subscriber quickly. Eventually, 
revoking and substituting the compromised keys and 
security algorithms would impose additional costs to 
the service provider.  
Additionally the subscriber is compelled to be 
bound to one specific STB pre-determined by the 
service provider; as such he can not access his 
entitlements via an arbitrary STB or receive contents 
from any other service providers [1].  
The abovementioned issues are well-known in Pay-
TV systems. There have been various activities to 
resolve them from very beginning of ratifying the CA 
system in the DVB group. However, an effective 
solution has not yet been suggested to provide a 
platform whereby not only current issues but also 
long term demands of the market can be satisfied 
effectively.  
Herewith, taking into account the current research 
and industrial activities regarding the convergence of 
services and networks, we are introducing new 
elements from mobile technology into the traditional 
Pay-TV system to ultimately transfer this system to a 
more flexible, intelligent, scalable, interoperable and 
ubiquitous system. The following chapter treats the 
abovementioned requirements through employing 
various security architectures. 
III. SYSTEM DESIGN 
The Mobile Integrated Conditional Access System 
(MICAS) introduces new subsystems into the current 
Pay-TV system which are explained as follows.  
It is postulated that the STB located at the vicinity 
of the subscriber supports Bluetooth and/or GSM 
communications and has a unique universal identity 
(STB-ID), which is recognizable by the service 
provider in the network. It is also assumed that the 
subscriber runs an application (Follow-Me 
application) on his/her mobile phone to generate 
subscription requests. This application can be 
installed in the form of a MIDlet on subscriber’s Java-
enabled mobile phone by mobile phone 
manufacturers, service providers or by subscriber 
itself. 
The MICAS is described by explaining a general 
use case scenario where a subscriber would like to 
view a programme (or a channel) included in his/her 
subscription package, from an arbitrary STB. The 
subscriber needs to run the Follow-Me application to 
discover the available Bluetooth devices operating at 
the vicinity of the subscriber. After selecting the 
intended STB, the pairing process is performed 
between subscriber’s mobile phone and STB. The 
STB-ID is then transferred to the mobile through 
Bluetooth channel. The Follow-Me application 
provides the subscriber with a list of Follow-Me 
service providers followed by associated services. 
After selecting the service provider and desired 
service(s), the Follow-Me application generates a 
subscription request message, which includes the 
service description, subscriber’s International Mobile 
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Subscriber Identity (IMSI), STB-ID and subscriber’s 
register code that shows whether the subscriber’s 
mobile phone is compliant with service provider’s 
security and privacy policy. The Follow-Me 
application then sends the subscription request to the 
service provider. 
At the transmitter head-end, Message Handling 
Subsystem (MHSS) handles subscribers’ requests 
received from its GSM interface. It processes 
subscription requests and checks if subscriber and 
STB are presenting valid identities (ID). If the identity 
check process succeeds, the MHSS will contact the 
Subscriber Handling Subsystem (SMS). The SMS 
checks the subscriber’s records and entitlements, and 
accordingly instructs Subscriber Authorisation 
Subsystem to generate corresponding entitlement 
message (Security Object). The SAS returns the 
associated Security Object to the MHSS to be 
encoded and sent to the subscriber’s mobile phone. 
The MHSS checks the subscriber’s register code 
before transmitting the Security Object. If the register 
code is not complied with service provider’s security 
policy, the MHSS (re)initialise the subscriber’s SIM 
card using requisite Key information and security 
algorithms [13]. These information should be 
transferred securely and stored in a privileged domain 
on the SIM card, where is solely accessible to the 
Follow-Me service provider and/or mobile provider. 
This information should be treated as the same way as 
the GSM SIM treats GSM cipher keys. The Security 
Object processing can be shared between the SIM 
card and STB. Hence, the mobile phone can be as the 
main security elements or be an intermediary means 
to deliver the Security Objects to the STB to 
descramble contents. The security information 
encapsulated into the Security Object can convey any 
information regarding the Key hierarchical system 
[8].  
Fig. 2 shows the data flow in the system where 
Security Object (i.e. Master Key and rights) delivered 
to the STB via mobile phone, and EMM and ECM 
messages are broadcast to all receivers’ population. 
SIM card
IMSI, LAI, 
ICCID, etc.
Subscriber
Sub_ID, Reg Code
Encoder/Multiplexer
1- STB_ID
2- Subscription Request
6- Security APIs
7- Encoded Security Object 
(Master Key & Rights)
IMSI, IEMI
STB
STB_ID, APIs
8- Encoded Security 
Object
Smart card
<Optional>
Encoded EMM & ECM
MHSS
SAS
SMS
5- Security Object
4- Entitlements
EMM & ECM
3- Subscription Request
Figure 2: Delivery of security objects to the STB via mobile 
phone. 
The service provider might adopt additional 
security mechanisms to guarantee the integrity and 
confidentiality of the Security Objects. Therefore, in 
addition to the Follow-Me application, there might be 
other application(s) (SIM applet) running on the SIM 
card responsible for executing service provider’s 
specific security sensitive algorithms. The SIM 
applets can be designed to run encryption and 
decryption algorithms based on Key information 
provided by service provider. Moreover, these 
applications can provide the service operator with 
insight into subscribers’ behaviour [14]. This would 
generally improve the level of security and services 
offered to customers.  
The underlying protocol used to transfer data across 
GSM network can be Short Message Service (SMS) 
or Wireless Application Protocol (WAP) [12]. On the 
other side, the mobile phone may communicate with 
the STB through GSM or Bluetooth channel, 
depending on STB capabilities. The STB also needs 
to be equipped with standard Application Programme 
Interfaces (APIs) to handle I/O and possibly some 
security activities over interaction channel (i.e. GSM). 
These APIs shall be installed by STB manufacturer on 
secure domains (flash memory or smart card) to 
perform security-related algorithms and fulfil 
authentication, decryption and descrambling 
processes.  
There might be some concerns about exposing 
security information on Bluetooth channel. However, 
this issue can also be addressed using security 
services offered by Bluetooth technology [10], [11] 
and adopting additional cryptosystems and techniques 
to ascertain that data is not exposed and the security 
architecture fails gracefully.  
Fig. 3 shows the deployment diagram of the 
MICAS system presenting the correlation amongst 
security elements in the system.  
 
 
Figure 3: Overall layout of the system. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
In this document, the high-level security 
architecture for provisioning of a horizontal market in 
Pay-TV industry and for establishing interoperability 
amongst various CA systems was proposed. The 
Mobile Integrated Conditional Access System 
(MICAS) was explained.  The main benefits and 
novel aspects of the system were fully outlined. 
Furthermore, the Follow-Me service and Message 
Handling Subsystem (MHSS) in the broadcasting 
system were also described. 
The MICAS would reduce service deployment costs 
and subscription fees for service provider and end-
users respectively. It is also equally beneficial for 
end-users as there would be no need to have 
additional receiver(s) to join the other service 
providers; as the proposed system provides a dynamic 
platform which affords interoperability amongst 
service providers. Moreover, it improves the overall 
security in the system by interacting with receiver 
head-end and downloading new security mechanisms 
on the fly as and when it is needed. Furthermore, the 
functions of revoking the compromised keys and 
monitoring the contractual behaviour of subscribers 
are performed automatically and cost-effectively 
through GSM (or its descendants like UMTS, 3G and 
etc) interaction channel. Other advantages of such 
interactions would be emergence of wider range of 
personalised services as well as ubiquitous access to 
them which comes with the Follow-me service.  
It is worthwhile noting that the concurrency 
between delivery and processing of entitlement 
messages are very important to the success of the 
proposed architectures. Failure to present digital 
contents shortly after a service being subscribed 
would likely cause customer dissatisfaction and raise 
complaints. Hence, implementation of underlying 
subsystems which are operating at transmitter side, 
mobile phone and STB and also considering 
appropriate transport protocols are of great 
importance. Least but not the last, it is important to 
ensure that security requirements are met by proposed 
security architectures. Therefore, analysing security 
threads and introducing security counter-attacks play 
great role in success of the proposal. Our research 
which we are in the process of conducting, addresses 
the above mentioned concerns and also the effect of 
GSM network performance on the proposed system, 
the security measurements, the implementation and 
finally thorough analysis of the related subsystems.  
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